Is such treachery beyond comprehension?
When a young man joins the Armed Forces he assumes he will be serving his country. For the majority, that assumption is valid. For the minority that find themselves in combat, they quickly learn that they will be serving their brothers. The President won’t be dragging you to safety. The Constitution will not cover your advance or withdraw. Your brothers will.
L/Cpl. Joseph Hargrove, Pfc. Gary Hall and Pvt. Danny Marshall were covering the withdraw of their fellow Marines. How long after the sound of the last helicopter did they realize there would be no more? What was their conversation like?
Speculating on the actions of the missing men may be inappropriate. But there are few if any servicemen involved in that mission who did not at least briefly, put himself in that dilemma. They would have expected a count and a discovery of their absence. They would have expected plans to be drawn up to return for them. They may have cursed themselves for the spot they found themselves in. It is almost a certainty that they would have agonized over the safety of those risking their lives to come get them. Hargrove, Hall and Marshall, like any other serviceman of that era would have expected at the very least, an attempt.
But this was 1975. Only a few then, suspected government treachery concerning Vietnam MIAs; most of them families of the missing left alive in Vietnam. This was before some damning documents were declassified. This was prior to any reasonable grasp on the part of American citizens that its leaders would be capable of purposely leaving live men behind in the custody of communist butchers.
These expectations of the missing Marines were met. Their recovery was being planned by their brothers; the ones who understood their plight. But something happened. Those plans were abruptly canceled. No one knew why.
The Week That Went Away
On May 20th CINCPAC ordered its Fleet and Air Forces to ‘resume normal operations.’
“Once back at Okinawa, Capt. Miller, the [Skipper] of the Mayaguez, came to the Orawan Theater (at Camp Schaub, 9th Marine Regiment) to personally thank all of us,” recalls Rogers, “It was during this time that we held memorial services for the dead. The pamphlet, which I still have, is void of the names of Hargrove, Hall and Marshall.
“A day or so later we were all assembled and a Major General Houghton came to shake everyone’s hand and make some on the spot promotions.
“Then, life as a Marine resumed as normal with virtually nothing else being said about the operation or those left behind. That is how I spent the next 20 something years until I read an article in Popular Science (by Ralph Wetterhahn) where I learned that the JTFFA (Joint Task Force, Full Accounting; which are various agencies working the MIA issue) was on the island looking for remains.”
At the time of the memorial Rogers speaks of, Hargrove, Hall and Marshall were not part of the memorial service nor did they appear on the program honoring the fallen because they were non persons. The White House policy makers had not yet determined which status they should hold. After all, they could turn up on radio Khmer Rouge at any time. Senior Marine commanders said nothing.
The report of June 7th was concluded after the memorial services and recommended that the missing men be reclassified as KIA. Yet passages from that same report could have earned each a Silver Star.
Caution is in order to reach such damning conclusions about the President’s attitude toward those who fought under his direction. Again, there is no direct path to such pathology. A preponderance of evidence though, does wind its way to a conclusion which supports these assumptions.
A man left behind alive on a battlefield is such an egregious event that it is likely to create a new mission to retrieve him. Senior officers were once junior officers and surely understand the morale factor of abandoned men. Vietnam is full of stories where Para-rescue/Jumpers are taken deep into enemy territory to rescue one downed pilot or crewman. To scratch a live, downed pilot off the manifest and pretend he doesn’t exist would be cause for mutiny. In the famous “Bat 21” episode in 1972, nine Airmen were lost attempting to recover LtCol. Gene Hambleton. Although the air rescue was abandoned, Hambleton was eventually rescued via ground extraction led by Navy Seals. There was never a shortage of volunteers to go get him.
Nor do civilians spare any expense to save lives. When a mine caves in, no one opposes the money, manpower and risk involved to retrieve trapped miners; even if their fate is unknown.
But that is exactly what Marine senior commanders did when they scratched Hargrove, Hall and Marshall off the memorial roster. It is inconceivable that they would do that of their own accord. There had to be pressure from higher command and that pressure had to be intense.
Were there protests? Who knows? But no one of senior rank resigned a commission. Which is the more valuable asset; a lifelong carrier or personal integrity? We must withhold judgment until we have walked through the facts in the boots of those senior officers; because there are scenarios where integrity requires silence and the critical speculation it breeds.
One of these scenarios would require silence about the missing men so as not to cause the Khmer Rouge to hunt for them. Perhaps there was a rescue attempt in the works by Special Forces during the time the 3 men were officially non-existent. Perhaps the intelligence gathered during rescue planning confirmed they were executed by the time the investigation had concluded. However, it does seem that these efforts would have been exposed by now. Since they haven’t, this possibility seems unlikely. When it is considered that Henry Kissinger was willing to waste the American crewmen, benevolent explanations for senior officers on the scene appear even more remote. They should have been screaming at Washington.When Lt. Col. Austin did it, it worked.
Returning now to the question of treachery, the NSC meeting records show just how meddling the White House was in the tactical details of this mission and more alarming, their cynical attitude toward American lives. So it becomes easier to believe the unbelievable—that three U.S. Marines were inadvertently left behind in the heat of battle and their brothers were forbidden by the highest authority to go get them.
The men who fought in this battle were fighting evil on both sides; one known, one to be known only much later.
The cover up pertaining to the missing Marines as well as the circumstances surrounding the crash of the CH53 at NKP corrupted the true history of the last battle of the Vietnam War or more accurately, the War in Southeast Asia. With the exception of the average Grunt, most participants saw their mission as a gigantic failure. More than half the men who died were Air Force personnel and many believed it was poor and hasty planning as well as bad intelligence that killed them. There were some comments and criticism of senior commanders on the scene, some of which may be justified.
Few however, knew the big picture. Few knew that these senior commanders were being tugged and dragged like puppets over a tactical stage by their masters in Washington. Few knew that tactical missions were changed and changed again; intelligence issued and rescinded, bad and good. And all of this in a time frame of just hours.
For the average Grunt on Koh Tang or the Mayaguez itself, he knew for certain only one thing—he was alive.
For the Air Force Security Police, they knew they were set to go, but didn’t.
For the chopper pilots, crews and mechanics, they knew their part in the Mayaguezrescue itself was fairly ambiguous. It was Koh Tang that set their adrenaline.
For the Ford Administration, only the few hours it took to recover the Mayaguez was important. There would be medals and citations but there would be no crash at NKP, no bad intelligence, no talk of targeting Americans, little talk of Koh Tang or its Marines and absolutely no mention of missing men. Except for President Ford’s decisive and heroic action that saved the Mayaguezand its crew, it would be a week that went away.
The Decades of Ignorance
Only weeks after the battle the Marines of 2/9 were back in routine. Field exercises mingled units and the stories told by the Koh Tang veterans to other Marines could not be delivered in proper context. A Grunt sees no history; he sees his muzzle and 50 feet in front of it.
The Air Force participation was intriguing only because no one had ever heard of an Air Force/Marine operation conducted at sea. Of course, there wasn’t; ever nor since. The Marines had no knowledge of Air Force Security Forces and the Air Force Police assumed that the Marines had been decimated.
The Pacific Stars and Stripes, the military newspaper was a good source for rumor and speculation when added to the personal stories of the participants. Since participants were scattered throughout Asia after the action, there was no way to grasp those 3 days in May with any cohesion. Add to that the very common inaccuracies of any history written shortly after the event it describes and the uncommon discouragement of discussion, it is not surprising that what would become the Mayaguez Incident played out different histories to different factions.
This caused some chauvinism towards the Air Force by uninformed Marines on Okinawa who resented their participation in an obvious Marine/Navy operation. Air Force Security Police were completely forgotten. The CO and senior officers of the 7th Air Force were unfairly criticized and the military actions during that conflict in general, were portrayed as a military version of Keystone Kops.
In hindsight and proper context, the Mayaguez Incident was one of the most amazing military success stories in American history given the limited time and resources available to its participants and the stakes at play.
The Three Stories of May, 1975
In 2009 the merchant ship SS Maersk Alabama was pirated by Somalis in the Indian Ocean. Reporter after reporter appeared on newscasts stating that this was the first act of piracy on an American vessel since President Jefferson defeated the Barbary pirates at Tripoli in 1805.
Hadn’t anyone ever heard of the Mayaguez?
Here are its 3 stories:
THE MAYAGUEZ PIRACY
The first story begins when the Mayaguez is seized off the coast of Cambodia. We shall call this the Mayaguez Piracy. President Ford meets with his National Security Council and they make plans to teach Cambodia a lesson. This will be personal and President Ford himself will be leading the Army. He orders Gen. Burns to invent a new tactic of Air Force Security Police to be dropped aboard a vessel full of enemy soldiers by Special Operations and Rescue choppers to be drawn from three Thailand bases.
CINCPAC is to oversee the operation and it orders CINCPACFLT (the Navy) to the area.
The President will be in direct contact with the pilots of some aircraft who will be assigned to bomb the Cambodian mainland and keep all small boats near the Mayaguez from reaching the mainland. On the recommendation of Secretary of State Henry Kissinger, there is a brief period when Ford orders all boats sunk even if they contain the crew of the Mayaguez.
In the haste ordered by the President a chopper goes down in Thailand with 23 men aboard. All are lost.
The President then changes his mind and orders Gen. Burns to develop yet a new tactic of an Air Force/Marine assault on an island that may house some or all of the Mayaguez crew he was willing to sacrifice just a few hours ago.
Gen. Burns complies as best he can since he has no Marines as yet to work with to plan the new mission.
There are no useable maps of the island and the intelligence is conflicting. There are 20 to 30 irregulars waiting for the Marines on the island but there are also 120 to 150. Then there are as many as 300. Each of these figures is handed to several different officers. The Marine ground commander gets the 20-30 version.
There are not enough choppers to take all the Marines in on one insertion on Koh Tang so three phases are planned with four hour, round trip intervals.
Early on the morning of the 15th of May, Marines are flown to the USS Holt to prepare to board the Mayaguez. Simultaneously, other Marines are flown to Koh Tang Island to rescue the crew; or just to determine if any of the crew are on the island. The previous morning the White House had been debating with a pilot on the wisdom of sinking a boat full of ‘Caucasians’ headed for the mainland. The pilot tries to intimidate the boat but will not murder ‘Caucasians’.
Marines on board the Holt board the Mayaguez and find it empty. The Marines also assault Koh Tang and find it full. Two choppers are shot down on East Beach with thirteen lives lost, 25 pinned down and more floating in the water hoping to be rescued.
One chopper goes down off of West beach with the loss of one man. Another chopper barely makes it to Thailand with all its Marines still on board. They will come back. The chopper will not.
The Marine ground commander, Lt. Col. Randall Austin’s chopper had to land 1000 or so meters south of West Beach due to heavy fire. He has to link up with the men on West Beach and does. In the process one Marine is lost.
The USS Wilson notices a boat full of ‘Caucasians’ headed for the Mayaguez and intercepts them. It is the crew of the Mayaguez. Mission accomplished. The crew is free.
President Ford orders all military action to cease. He has his victory.
This is the story of the Mayaguez piracy; the first story. Under President Ford’s direct leadership with the assistance of the NSC, the 40 crewmembers are free and make plans to get underway.
The cost? Thirty-eight American servicemen lost, twenty-three of which wouldn’t count.
THE BATTLE OF KOH TANG ISLAND
Now begins the second Mayaguez story; a story more accurately named, the Battle of Koh Tang Island.
The second wave of Marines is in route to Koh Tang when President Ford orders them to return. The mission is over. Lt. Col. Austin finds out and objects. He needs to get his men off the island and he needs more men to secure and organize a withdraw. The President is presumably persuaded to allow the second wave of Marines to return to Koh Tang as planned and Austin gets his way. The second wave will be coming.
With victory secure, President Ford wraps up his White House dinner party and retires for the evening. With the departure of the Commander-in-Chief from overall tactical command, the military must now be trusted to extract the Marines on its own. These on-scene commanders would consist mainly of junior officers and enlisted men many of whom had never seen combat.
Now that there was actual intelligence, complements of the Khmer gunfire and the ability of those on scene to interpret what it meant, the choppers in the second wave knew what they were up against and landed their second wave of Marines successfully.
Throughout the day the East Beach men were the priority because their position was most vulnerable. Several attempts, including one to scout for survivors of the first chopper hit that morning, were unsuccessful and the machines were put out of action—but not lost.
Mechanics at NKP had worked feverishly to ready one more chopper which headed to Koh Tang with a fresh crew.
Later that afternoon air support came from two OV-10s that could remain on station for hours. With their assistance and cover fire from sailors on the Wilson’s gig, the East Beach was evacuated.
As darkness drew near the Air Force was down to only three flyable choppers, one of which was held together by duct tape and rubber bands.
Perhaps it is not well known but there were plans from senior command to leave the Marines on the island overnight. The chopper pilots and the FAC in the OV-10 didn’t consider that option.
Those three choppers made two extractions each, under fire, in complete darkness and overloaded. One of them cut his trip time by making an air show quality landing on the Holt’s postage stamp.
Only when they were assured that all Marines had been recovered did they leave the scene.
This was the second Mayaguez story; the Battle of Koh Tang Island. This was done without any guidance, direction or leadership from Washington.
The cost? Not a single man lost. Not a single Airman, Marine or Sailor lost his life when those that were on scene were allowed to assess and conduct the mission in the manner they saw fit. Not a single man died from the lack of specific training or precident by men who could think, adjust, act and care.
THE MAYAGUEZ AFTERMATH
The third Mayaguezstory which we will call the Mayaguez Aftermath, has the President awake once more. In the noise, confusion and the blackness three Marines didn’t get picked up at Koh Tang. They were missing. This means the Battle of Koh Tang Island is not yet complete. Preparations are made to go back and get them. But a mysterious stand down engulfs the third Mayaguezstory. No one can tell where it came from.
Why not let the men of the second story go after the missing men? After all, they have an excellent track record and they all volunteer.
Wait. Maybe the mystery will change its mind. But it doesn’t. It never does. In fact, it erases those men—or tries to. In doing so it corrupts the story. The three Mayaguez stories will be consolidated into just one; an ‘official’ one which appears in the Pacific Stars and Stripes; where the three missing men will cease to be until a fate for them can be determined, not by facts but by expediency. The president must look good. And it appears he succeeded.
The cost? Three missing—then executed. One thousand carrying a burden they do not deserve. Millions denied a story they should hear.
These consolidated stories are called the’ Mayaguez Incident.’ It will leave in its wake a perpetual confusion that even those who participated are left wondering about.
“I got a call from the skipper of the Mayaguez,” Ford said, “and he told me that it was the action of me, President Ford, that saved the lives of the crew of the Mayaguez.”
“Supposing some of the boats near the island have Americans on it? Should we send some order to use only riot control agents there?”
“I think the pilot should sink them. He should destroy the boats and not send situation reports.”
In retrospect, the Mayaguez Incident was much like the war it closed. Vietnam had a ‘Tonkin Gulf’ incident. Both began with a noble mission. Both were conducted from Washington and both deteriorated from noble cause to survival for the duration.
Both left live men behind—purposely, to spare political egos.
There were differences, however.
In Vietnam there were great military strategists who sent back daily situation reports to the American people. One of them, Walter Cronkite declared the War unwinnable when the communists were suffering a defeat so devastating after Tet, 1968 that it took them four years to recover. George Orwell called it ‘newspeak’. America called it ‘reporting’. The communists called it ‘strategy’. How else do you turn the complete destruction of your offensive military assets into the turning point of your eventual victory? This was strategic Kung Fu; the art of using your opponent’s power against him; in this case, the power of the press. Lenin referred to people such as these American and foreign reporters as ‘useful idiots’.
The Battle of Koh Tang Island had no real time observers to report American strategic flaws to the home folks. This allowed its participants to adjust to the initial failures. They devised and executed a plan to fit the situation and they were flawless (and lucky) until their Commander-in-Chief woke up.
But this lack of press involvement also allowed the Commander-in-Chief to write his own history. It is not surprising that President Ford considered himself a hero and accepted the accolades of a hero-starved country.
The Last Man
In WWI an armistice was to take place in France at 11:00 AM on the 11th of November 1918. The Germans and the Allies in the trenches knew this. Who would stick his head up at 10:59 AM? Moreover, who would be the first to stick his head up at 11:01 AM?
As the Vietnam War progressed, the practice of sending complete cohesive units was gradually discontinued, deferring to replacement troops, temporary assignments and other means to meet manpower needs. An individual soldier would serve a set period of time, usually 13 months as a ’tour of duty.’
The Vietnam era spawned a lot of new entries for the military dictionary; among them, ‘short-timer’. A short-timer was one who would be getting close to his stateside rotation date; his ticket home. So on an individual level, a soldier knew the date of his own armistice.
Many kept a short-time calendar, perhaps drawn on his helmet cover or scratched in a notebook. As the date of his departure from Vietnam grew near, so did his dread. For one thing the Vietnam soldier had in common with the men in the trenches of WWI to the exclusion of all others was advanced notice of the exact date of his war’s end. No one wanted to meet his maker at 10:59 AM on the last day. The soldier in WWI kept his head down well past 11:00 AM because he did not want to be the last man. Who is it though, that ever considered a fate as the last man lost during the Vietnam War? It seemed like it would go on forever.
There has to be a last man, just as there has to be a first. The Mayaguez Incident is considered the last battle of the Vietnam War. PJ Wayne Fisk is officially the last soldier to engage the enemy in that war. So who was the last man lost?
The last man is actually three men, Joseph Hargrove, Gary Hall and Danny Marshall. So we can never be sure of whom the last man actually was. Nor do we know if any of these men engaged the enemy when left behind on Koh Tang. Does it matter?
Who was the last to die in the Civil War? WWII? Do you know?
Perhaps it doesn’t matter. But the Vietnam War consumed an entire generation. Danny Marshall was born in the year the first soldier died in Vietnam. Would that not be the most potent symbol of that War?
Perhaps it’s fitting to not know. For all three of these men will forever define the most tragic and grievous symbol of that War—the political will to purposely abandon those who were willing to sacrifice so that others might enjoy the freedom they gave up, and the absolute resolve of a government to prevent their brothers from going after them.
Bill Sauerwine, a Vietnam veteran who divided a career between the Marines and the Army pointed out that the Vietnam soldier is the only soldier to demand an accounting of his missing comrades. Perhaps this is because the Vietnam soldier was the only soldier left behind purposely by its government. America should seriously reconsider the wisdom of coming to the aide of an ally and allowing Walter Cronkite the power to predetermine the mission’s outcome. There is a lot of waste generated in such a strategy. If you don’t win your war, you can’t demand your people back.
The Mayaguez story ends with the abandonment of Joseph, Gary and Danny by the same evil that abandoned over 600 others before them and if any one of them is alive today, when the last one passes on, he will be the last man .Who is he, or who will he be? God will know and we will not.
Dick Lancaster USMC
2010